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Introduction
During the early 1930’s, both India’s and Australia’s airline industries gained impetus
from the Empire Mail Scheme and through their links with Imperial Airways as it
vied with other colonial powers and the United States to dominate the network of
developing international airline services. World War II interrupted the activities of the
commercial airlines, but by war’s end they were carrying out extensive business with
the military and were gaining access to transport aircraft. Air India and Qantas both
emerged during the 1940’s as stronger airlines, but they soon faced the threat of fierce
competition as numerous ex-war pilots commenced small airlines. This resulted in a
crisis of financial instability that threatened the orderly development of this
strategically important form of transport, particularly at a time when its appeal to
passengers was growing.
The problem was not unique to India and Australia and it is difficult to find an
exception to the rule that governments imposed strict regulations on their airline
industries. India brought the airlines under direct control by nationalising the industry
and forming two airlines, one for domestic operations and one for international
operations. Nationalisation of the airline industry was not sanctioned under
Australia’s Constitution and the Government entered into a compromise arrangement;
a government airline was maintained in strictly controlled competition with a private
sector airline in the domestic market. The sole international carrier, Qantas, was
completely owned by the Australian Government. In the United States, the
Government granted “grandfather” rights to 16 airlines and then prevented other
would-be competitors from entering the industry. The US Government also wished to
avoid destructive competition and it controlled fares and entry to routes to ensure its
industry developed in an orderly way.
These regulatory arrangements for domestic markets changed little in the next 30 to
40 years, but history is beginning to repeat itself as all countries grapple with the
problems of how to introduce a more liberal regime of competition into the airline
industry. Just as market pressures produced similar responses during the period dating
from the late 1930’s to the early 1950’s, there is an impression of inevitability about
the reform process now. The United States, with the richest domestic airline market in
the world, took the lead when it deregulated in 1978. Since then, its industry has gone
through several phases of adjustment, and some argue that it has not fully adjusted.
Not all of the outcomes have been welcomed but deregulation clearly has had benefits
in terms of increased productivity, lower fares and an expanded market. Along the
way, many airlines have failed, and the industry continues to be a high risk business
with low returns.
In the intervening period since 1978, many other countries have embraced more
liberal policies. Australia deregulated its industry in 1990 and subsequently merged
its two national carriers before privatising the airline, and this step made it impossible
to deny private sector airlines to compete in international markets. In this respect,
Australia’s experience is being reflected throughout the Asian region where rapid
economic growth and tourism are combining to produce the highest traffic growth
rates in the world. The expectation is that this growth will continue for at least the
next ten years and some countries such as China and India will sustain the momentum
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for much longer. The result is that, outside the USA, the largest domestic markets will
be in Asian countries.
Table 1: Growth Prospects - Domestic Airline Markets
Region 1994 2014
Millions
RPK’s
Share Millions
RPK’s
Share
USA 597,313 65.3% 1,356,797 58.7%
Far East 63,407 6.9% 289,234 12.5%
Japan 53,086 5.8% 157,679 6.8%
Australasia 24,170 2.6% 77,824 3.4%
France 19,876 2.2% 46,680 2.0%
UK 6,201 0.7% 15,918 0.7%
Other Europe 30,840 3.4% 73,016 3.2%
Former USSR 56,126 6.1% 142,608 6.2%
Other 63,209 6.9% 153,077 6.6%
Total 914,228 2,312,833
Source: McDonnell Douglas (1995) World Economic and Traffic Outlook 1994-95.
There are three important implications. One is that this growth has placed pressures
on the national carriers to perform and resource constraints have made it difficult to
respond. The tourism sector has been an ardent advocate of change, arguing that
important economic benefits cannot be realised with an unreliable and under-
resourced airline system (Louden 1993). Across the region there has been an
increasing reliance on the private sector, but in aviation, a business that requires
technical, financial, marketing and administrative sophistication, the speed with
which more liberal policies are being pursued brings with it a set of fresh challenges.
In some countries, the transition has been traumatic as it has been impossible to match
the growth in the market with experienced pilots, engineers, managers, air traffic
controllers and regulators, not to mention airport infrastructure. These problems had
severe consequences in China and India during the early 1990's.
A second implication is that the private sector has been eager to take advantage of the
commercial opportunities and it has not been slow to produce new airlines (Nuutinen
1991, Bailey 1993). With few exceptions, Governments have welcomed the new
carriers, but adjusting to a new competitive regime is a difficult process to manage. In
the United States and Australia, for example, there was a considerable amount of
research and debate leading up the decision to deregulate, and even then it has been
the relentless pressure of the market that has dictated the need to make further and
further adjustments. In the Asian context, the growth has been so rapid that prior
evaluation of changes in policy  has not been possible. The first tentative step towards
a more liberal policy is to allow the private sector airlines some scope to operate,
albeit with tight regulations over fares and about the needs to service “social routes”
(Hooper et al 1996). Air transport continues to play a pivotal role in the economic and
social development of many countries in the region, and the new airlines are expected
to cross-subsidise these operations on the same basis as the national carrier.
In the United States, many of the new carriers that emerged immediately after
deregulation possessed a competitive advantage; they used older aircraft, paid their
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staff less money, achieved higher labour productivity and kept overheads to a
minimum. This allowed them to take a price leadership position to gain market share.
In the Asian context, the new carriers often use new aircraft and they pay their pilots
more than the national carrier with whom they compete. Their fleets are small and
they often have poor aircraft utilisation because of restrictions at airports. With
regulated fares and the obligation to operate some unprofitable services, there are
inevitable financial pressures. Many believe that access to international routes as the
way out (Hooper 1996).
India is one of a number of Asian countries that have become recent converts to
liberalism. In formulating policies it is tempting to draw lessons from the experiences
of the USA, but India’s airline market is relatively undeveloped and air transport
plays a vital role in supporting national objectives. This paper examines the parallels
between Australia and India because, like India, Australia deregulated when it had
two national carriers. Australia’s domestic airline market is concentrated on a small
number of routes and the remainder of the network lacks the density of traffic to
promote competition, but airline services are regarded as a vital part of the
infrastructure to support the tourism sector. The paper explores the experiences of the
most developed market in the world, the United States, and of a smaller, but also well
developed market, Australia, and draws lessons relevant to India as its policies
continue to evolve and as its carriers seek to develop viable strategies.
The Deregulation Movement
The United States
The Origins of the Regulatory System
The origins of a “viable” commercial airline industry in the USA can be traced to
1925 when the US Post Office began to support operators through its generous
contracts to carry mail. The industry continued to develop in an orderly manner until
responsibility for administering the subsidies passed to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. That organisation placed pressure on the operators to accept lower rates,
so much so that the industry lapsed into financial instability. The Government of the
day accepted that competition had got out of hand and, especially as the airlines were
beginning to carry passengers on a regular basis, it passed the Civil Aeronautics
Board Act (1938) with the aim of stabilising the industry.
The CAB was authorised to award individual routes to carriers, to specify what fares
could be charged, and to ensure safe airline operations. It was to allow competition
only to the extent it was necessary and its first act was to issue “grandfather rights” to
the 16 airlines that were operating in 1938. For the next forty years it turned down
every one of the more than 100 applications to provide new services and the number
of airlines had reduced to 11 (Pickrell 1991).
At an early stage, the CAB took the view that services to small communities should
be supported by the Government through a system of direct subsidies. Although it
attempted to promote efficiency, the scheme evolved into a cost-plus mechanism and
the burden on the Government was increasing continually. In the early 1960’s, the
CAB was encouraging the “local” airlines to acquire more modern aircraft, but this
added to their demands for financial support. In 1966, an attempt was made to give
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the local service operators access to medium haul trunk routes to cross-subsidise the
services to small communities. At the same time, these carriers were allowed to
purchase jets and they were permitted to merge. However, this failed as well because
the profits of the local service carriers dipped sharply. Part of the reason was that the
local carriers now came into competition with the trunk operators.
By the commencement of the 1970’s, the US airline industry consisted of the trunk
carriers and the subsidised local service carriers, but another class of airline existed
below them. The CAB allowed for non-scheduled operations called “air taxi services”
that flew over relatively short distances on an on-demand basis. In the post World
War II period, this sector grew rapidly, only to become financially unstable. By 1951,
fewer than 50 of these commuters had survived. The CAB defined what constituted a
“non-scheduled” service in an attempt to prevent these small carriers encroaching on
the domain of the trunk and local carriers. Specifically, services were regarded as
being non-scheduled if the customer would not be able to assume services would be
provided on a regular basis, the CAB ruling that the limit was ten round trips between
any two points in a month. This gave rise to considerable debate about whether the
“commuter” operators, as they became known, needed to be certified by the CAB, but
the outcome was that the they were left alone provided they did not engage in unfair
methods of competition.
The Deregulation Movement
The 1970’s heralded in a period of growth and dynamism that was to result in major
changes to the way the industry would operate. The market was growing rapidly and
improvements in aircraft technology were allowing costs to be reduced and services
to be improved. Under these pressures, the CAB introduced a formula for setting
fares, incorporating a flag-fall element and a rate per kilometre. By the middle of the
decade, restrictions on charter operators were relaxed and the scheduled carriers were
confronted with the emergence of low-cost, charter operators flying on a regular basis
with no-frills service.
This prompted a significant response. American Airlines applied to the CAB in 1977
to allow it to introduce deep discounts and it subsequently introduced its “Super
Saver” deals of up to 45% off the normal coach (economy) fare. The impact on the
market was dramatic with traffic growing by as much as 60%. This provided evidence
that the market was being constrained by the fares policies of the CAB. Moreover,
there were two States, California and Texas, that were large enough to have airline
operations entirely within their own jurisdictions, and both had pursued relatively
liberal approaches to entry. The intrastate airlines showed that small airlines could
survive and their costs were significantly lower than the carriers regulated by the
CAB.
By 1978, the tide of opinion had turned firmly against regulation. There had been a
considerable amount of work by academics to investigate whether there were genuine
economies of scale, whether airline competition was likely to be destructive and what
benefits would flow from deregulation. One important issue was that the majority of
routes was served by a single airline and it was likely this would continue in a
deregulated environment. However, there was a persuasive argument that, provided a
market is contestable, the threat of potential competition would be a sufficient force to
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check the abuse of monopoly power. This proved to be very persuasive at the time
and the combined weight of arguments from all sources resulted in Congress passing
the Airline Deregulation Act in October (1978). With immediate effect, the airlines
had freedom to set their own fares and less restrictive control over their networks
(Button 1989).
One of the residual concerns was that the major airlines would withdraw their
services to small communities, and a feature of deregulation was that subsidies could
be provided to commuter airlines. “Essential air services” were to be subsidised by
the CAB on the basis that carriers applied to the CAB to provide services to
communities that enjoyed services prior to deregulation and where the 1978 traffic
levels were not more than 40 arriving and 40 departing passengers. The bidding was
competitive and the contract would be for a period not exceeding two years.
However, many operators preferred to remain unencumbered by the commitments
required under the subsidy scheme and the experience was that the smaller
communities were generally better off after deregulation. The trade-off was that larger
jet aircraft were swapped for smaller, turboprop aircraft running, mostly, with
improved frequency (Meyer & Oster 1984).
The Experiment With Competition
There have been several distinct phases in the process of adjustment to deregulation.
At first, there was considerable activity by new entrant airlines. There were several
that attempted to compete on service standards to capture high yield traffic, but most
adopted a strategy winning market share based on lower fares. The incumbent airlines
had the disadvantage that their employees had extracted generous conditions and
incomes over a long period of time. Faced with powerful unions, these airlines were
unable to match the new start-up airlines that were able to recruit on different terms.
In addition to having lower labour costs, many of the new entrants were able to
acquire used aircraft at favourable prices. Airlines such as People Express were
setting the benchmark for low fares and generating significant increases in travel.
During the second phase, the incumbents were able to decrease their labour costs to
some extent. Also, these airlines pulled out of shorter routes where the traffic density
was low, allowing the regional carriers to expand. This had an added advantage for
those major carriers that had developed a dominant position with the feeder carriers;
the economics of operating a scheduled airline service are such that a small number of
passengers delivered to the carrier from its allied feeders could mean the difference
between a healthy profit and a loss.
During the third phase, the larger carriers went from strength to strength. The most
notable feature was the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks. This strategy yielded
some economies in operations as aircraft and ground equipment could be used more
productively, but there were substantial marketing benefits. The hub-and-spoke
strategy allows the airline to increase the number of origin-destination combinations
in an exponential relationship so that the number of “products” available to
consumers is much larger than it is under other network strategies. When the airline
also has a frequent flyer scheme, the attraction to the traveller of choosing an airline
with the largest number of connections is very high. In addition, frequency can be
improved, but the traveller can suffer through poor connections at the hub. The larger
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carriers had the advantage of on-line connections without the need for the traveller to
make difficult transfers.
Through their code-sharing agreements with their partner airlines, the larger carriers
further exploited this advantage, particularly since their computer reservations
systems had in-built biases towards themselves and for code share partners. The
major carriers used their computerised information systems (CRS and yield
management) as competitive weapons against their weaker rivals and they developed
“fortress hubs” at which it was difficult for another airline to attack them. There is
some debate about higher fares resulted at these dominated hubs.
The entire industry suffered huge losses and there were many failures. Of the 11
incumbent airlines in 1978, Braniff ceased in 1989 after several years of trouble in
1989, Eastern was declared bankrupt in the same year, and Continental was kept
operating under Chapter 11 provisions that provide a bankrupt enterprise protection
from its creditors so that it can trade out of trouble. Western was acquired by Delta in
1986 and National was taken over by Pan Am in 1980, the national icon that has since
gone. USAir is the single remaining local service carrier. The only airline to have
made a profit throughout the entire period is Southwest Airlines, and few of the new
entrants survived for more than a few years.
The outcome is an industry more than ever dominated by a small number of airlines
and there are some who would argue that the industry requires re-regulation to curb
the power of these carriers. However, productivity has increased for all airlines, and
while fares have increased on shorter routes they have fallen significantly on longer
routes.
The process of adjustment has been made more difficult because of the fluctuating
fortunes of the travel industry resulting from variations in economic conditions. Also,
there have been major advances in the uses of information technology, particularly in
the form of computerised reservations systems and yield/revenue management
systems. These have required adjustment to the way the airlines compete. However,
there have been institutional rigidities that have prevented any rapid change in the
relations between the airlines and organised labour.
Another factor in the adjustment process has been the integration of domestic and
international airline operations. Excepting Southwest Airlines, all of the major US
carriers are committed to international and domestic operations and they derive
significant strength from this. Pan Am, without significant access to the domestic
USA market, was severely weakened after deregulation and adoption of a more
liberal international policy. However, the international environment is more complex
than the domestic, particularly since the airlines are not free to adopt the networks
that would be the most efficient to serve their chosen markets. Access rights must be
negotiated through bilateral agreements, or marketing alliances must be struck with
other airlines already serving those markets. Some analysts have described these
alliances as part of a strategy to develop global airlines  (Oum & Taylor 1995), but
recent events such as the strained relations between Northwest and KLM and between
British Airways and US Air and its more recent attempts to link with American
Airlines illustrate the dynamic nature of these relationships.
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Australia
The Origins of the Regulatory System
The technology of aviation promised much for an isolated country like Australia with
its own internal transport challenges. Not surprisingly, Australian aviators were
amongst the leading pioneers during the 1920's and 1930's when aviation technology
had yet to prove its safety and reliability. Apart from requiring passengers with a
spirit of adventure, high costs constrained the airline market to the wealthy few. In
fact, the early airlines looked to government for assistance and, as in the United
States, it was provided in the form of subsidies for carrying mail.
Qantas, established by two ex-war pilots in 1921, is the only Australian airline to have
survived this era. Having been awarded a contract to carry mail, it developed services
in the remote areas of Queensland and the Northern Territory. It was advantageously
placed when the route from Southampton to Sydney, the longest in the world at that
time, was being planned. Qantas and Imperial joined forces in a joint venture Qantas
Empire Airways to serve the Singapore to Sydney leg.
By the early 1940’s, the commercial airlines had a regional focus and the only airline
with ambitions of putting the pieces together in a national network was Australian
National Airways (ANA). It was backed by British ship owners and the Labor
Government of the day feared this vital, emerging industry would be monopolised by
foreign interests that had, in the Government’s eyes, been well versed in monopoly
practices in the maritime sector.
The policy response was to nationalise the industry, but the Government found it
lacked the Constitutional power to do this. The Chifley Government then established
the Australian National Airlines Commission in 1945 and it commenced operations in
the domestic aviation market in 1946 as Trans-Australia Airlines (TAA). All
Government business went to the new airline and there was a clear message that, if a
monopoly were to develop, it would be in the public sector. TAA proved to be an
innovative airline with a committed staff and it soon established a powerful presence
in the market place. When the pro-business Menzies Government came into office in
1949, it also held the view that a natural monopoly was inevitable in a free market.
TAA’s popularity was such that it was not an option to close it down and to allow a
private sector monopoly to emerge. The compromise was that the Government
allowed a limited form of competition between TAA and the largest of the private
operators, ANA. To implement this policy, the Government entered into an agreement
in 1952 with ANA. The Government’s stated aim was to ensure that the industry
developed in an orderly fashion and that limited competition would provide
consumers with a choice while avoiding destructive or wasteful practices.
This first attempt to introduce a two airline policy failed within two years. One of the
reasons was that TAA was more effective than ANA in its marketing and in its choice
of aircraft. A more fundamental problem was that several smaller airlines were still
operating, mostly on a regional basis. One of these, Ansett Airlines, was run by an
aggressive entrepreneur who basically provided a no-frills service with low fares
alongside his main rivals. ANA tried several times to buy Ansett, but ultimately it was
Ansett that swallowed ANA. The Government signed a new agreement with Ansett
and that airline quickly acquired any remaining regional airlines that might pose a
threat to it.
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The Government’s powers to prevent new airlines competing on trunk routes were
limited under the Constitution and an important plank in the policy was the
Government’s commitment to deny any would-be airlines the right to import aircraft,
relying on its Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations. Under the two-airline
policy, fares and capacity were controlled, and the practice was to adopt the same
type of aircraft. The Government was the arbiter on how much capacity should be
introduced and there was a requirement that the capacity would be shared equally
between the two carriers. The policy even went so far as to require the airlines to
consult with each other on important commercial matters. Also, the Government
extended its guarantees for financing aircraft purchases to Ansett. Other provisions
related to the withdrawal of services on rural routes required evidence of the lack of
profitability or of consultations that would lead to replacement services by another
operator.
In 1981, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to the two airline policy in
enacting legislation that would remain in effect until 1990. However, there were some
changes that appeared to of minor significance at the time but which ultimately
proved to be the first steps towards deregulation. First, scope was created for regional
airlines expand their operations and to import jet aircraft. Second, there was a
commitment to convene a public inquiry into the merits of deregulation no later than
1985. Third, air fares were now to be determined by an independent body, the
Independent Air Fares Committee, using a cost-based formula approach.
The Deregulation Movement
Deregulation of the airline industry in the United States raised expectations that air
fares in Australia would fall in a more competitive environment, especially on the
longer sectors. Also, it appeared that the airlines had paid insufficient attention to the
more price-sensitive sectors of the market. The tourism industry was a vocal opponent
of the two airline policy claiming that agents had been denied opportunities to
develop attractive travel packages. Others noted that, though the population of the
USA was 15 times that of Australia’s, the number of passenger kilometres in the USA
were 38 times more than in Australia. Following deregulation in the USA, the number
of people travelling by air increased sharply as discounts became freely available. A
similar expectation was held for Australia.
A major influence on public opinion, however, was the expansion of East West
Airlines (EWA), a former regional carrier. EWA took full advantage of the change in
policy that allowed it to import jet aircraft and to expand its regional services. It
provided a service directly into a resort area in Southern Queensland but then opened
a new route that ultimately whetted the public’s taste for more competition. EWA had
a regional route from Sydney to Albury, the latter being on the New South Wales
border with Victoria. The new route connected Melbourne with Albury. Taking each
route independently, they fell within the definition of regional operations. However,
the Sydney-Melbourne airline market is by far the largest in Australia and EWA
began to exploit the connecting traffic, using low fares as the inducement. This
attracted widespread publicity and aroused further expectations about the benefits of a
more liberal airline policy.
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When the promised public review of the two airline policy was conducted, the
overwhelming number of submissions called for deregulation in one form or another.
Even the Federal Government’s own economic ministries advocated a more
competitive market. The main supporters of the two airline policy were the two
airlines deriving benefit from it, the Department of Transport and Communications
that administered it, and the union movement fearing job losses and changes in work
conditions. The review committee (May et al 1985) presented several options to the
Government without supporting any particular one, but the pressure on the
Government was so great that it announced it would serve notice to the airlines that it
would terminate the two airline policy effective October 1990. This delay was the
result of a requirement under the Airlines Agreement Act (1981) to give three years’
notice of change.
In simple terms, deregulation in Australia meant that the airlines were free to act like
any other business with the proviso that safety regulations had to be observed. New
operators were able to commence operations once they had been certified and the
airlines were free to set their own fares, choose whatever aircraft capacity they
wanted, and to withdraw from unprofitable routes. In common with other businesses,
they also needed to comply with general regulations on competition and on pricing
practices under the jurisdiction of the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices
Surveillance Authority (now combined as the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission).
The Experiment With Competition
Several events occurred prior to October 1990 that would constrain the opportunities
for new entrants. First, the owners of Ansett Airlines, TNT and New Limited,
acquired EWA. Second, they secured long-term leases over their own terminals at
Australia’s major airports with the result that any new carriers would have, at best,
limited airport facilities. Third, they prepared for deregulation by upgrading and
expanding their fleets and by improving their productivity. The Australian Airlines
Commission dropped its established trading name and adopted the title “Australian
Airlines” as part of a marketing campaign to shift its image in the eyes of consumers.
Also, when the pilot’s embarked upon industrial action to secure higher salaries, the
airlines took a tough stand and precipitated a lengthy strike and interruption to airline
services in 1989. Another development was that, as of July 1 1988, Qantas was
permitted to carry the passengers of other international airlines on the domestic
sectors of its services. However, the Minister for Transport and Communications
rejected the argument that the Closer Economic Relations trade agreement with New
Zealand would be extended to include aviation. By October 1990, Ansett and
Australian were well prepared for any new rival.
Several prospective entrants vied to become the first start-up airline. Compass won
the race and started in December 1990 with plans to capture a significant share of the
market. However, its chief executive, Bryan Gray, argued that the incumbent airlines
should not respond to Compass because his airline would succeed entirely on new
traffic. Gray also claimed his airline would be able to produce seat kilometres at a
significantly lower cost because it had low overheads and the most efficient aircraft
operating in Australia at that time. When Compass under-cut its rivals’ fares, they
responded immediately and the public enjoyed a protracted price war lasting twelve
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months. To be fair, airline deregulation commenced during a severe recession and the
market had not recovered fully from the effects of the pilots’ dispute. All businesses
around Australia were cutting their prices and an advantage of airline deregulation
was that the airlines were free to respond to the conditions.
Compass faced liquidity problems from an early stage and appears to have been
under-capitalised. It suffered some set-backs as a result of factors beyond its own
control (eg late delivery of aircraft, access to terminals), but it also performed poorly
because of its strategy (Nyathi et al 1993). In the final event, Compass was brought
under the control of a provisional liquidator just one year after starting. Subsequently,
Southern Cross Airlines introduced services operating under the Compass logo, but it
too failed after a short time.
Since deregulation, the demand for airline travel has increased sharply, especially for
some destinations, and this was despite a sharp economic recession (Bureau of
Transport and Communications Economics 1991). The proportion of passengers
travelling on some form of a discount moved from 40% to around 45% by mid-1991,
with the average discount appearing to increase, and the overall fare level was
reduced in the initial stages. The competition was evident mostly on those routes
where traffic levels were already high. Air fares fell most on the long routes while
there were some increases on the shorter routes under 500 kilometres, mirroring the
experiences in the USA. Just in the first year of deregulation, average air fares fell by
35.2% on routes of more than 2,000 kilometres (Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission 1996).
When the public review of airline regulation was being conducted in 1985, it was
made clear that the Government would not consider privatisation of Australian
Airlines. By 1991, the Government had changed its mind, and both Qantas and
Australian Airlines were being prepared for sale. However, it realised that the sale
would be easier and would yield more if the two carriers were merged. In September
1991, Qantas acquired Australian Airlines from the Government for a cost of $400
million (Australian) and stated that it would create seamless domestic and
international airline services. In February 1992, the Government made another policy
announcement saying that Qantas would be permitted to sell any spare capacity on its
international services to the domestic market.
These steps, though, could not be taken without making further guarantees about
competition. At first, the Government indicated it was in favour of opening the
Australian airline market to New Zealand carriers, but then it backed away from this
position. In the end, the Government could not deny Ansett, or any other Australian
operator, the opportunity to fly on international routes and this led to the
establishment of the International Air Services Commission to allocate capacity fairly
among the airlines (Findlay & Round 1994).
Since then, Qantas has been sold, with 25% being held by British Airways. Qantas
also owns 20% of Air New Zealand. Meanwhile, Ansett’s parents both have wanted
to dispose of their shares in the airline and, finally, it has been agreed that Air New
Zealand will purchase TNT’s 50% share in two stages. This development has required
extensive negotiations to satisfy the regulatory authorities of both countries that
competition would remain effective. The cross-ownership relations between Qantas
and Air New Zealand were one consideration, but Ansett New Zealand was the only
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serious competitor to Air New Zealand in the New Zealand domestic market. One of
the outcomes has been that it has been decided that there will be a single aviation
market including Australia and New Zealand.
Within a decade, the Government was forced to abandon its long-standing policy on
the regulation of domestic aviation, it merged and privatised its airlines, it permitted
other Australian carriers to fly international routes, and it has entered into a regional
aviation agreement. Competition and the dynamism of the market provided fewer and
fewer alternatives as time progressed.
India
The Origins of the Regulatory System
When the Tata company formed a special aviation department in October of 1932, it
provided one of the foundation stones of the modern Indian airline industry. Tata
offered a scheduled airline service to connect with Imperial Airways flights at
Karachi. As with Qantas, the new Indian airline benefited from the Empire Mail
Scheme and it built up an impressive fleet. World War II interrupted the development
of Tata’s airline, but gradually it built its fleet up again as it was able to acquire
aircraft like the DC-3 from the military. In 1946, the airline was floated as a public
company and renamed “Air India” and investments were made in modern aircraft.
In common with the USA and Australia, India experienced a boom in commercial
aviation after the war as pilots took advantage of surplus aircraft to commence their
own businesses. It has been reported that over 100 airlines sprang up in this period
and vied with Air India for market share (Brimson 1985). Under these conditions, the
industry was unstable and the Government felt compelled to intervene. In 1947, 49%
of the shares of Air India were acquired by the Government of India and it was
intended that this carrier would serve international routes.
The remainder of the industry was in a financially precarious state and the decision
ultimately was made to nationalise the industry. The Government took the nine
strongest airlines and merged them to form the Indian Airlines Corporation. Indian
Airlines was to operate domestic services and Air-India International, as it was now
known, was to operate as the national flag carrier. The latter was now fully owned by
the Government. The industry was to be regulated by the Director General of Civil
Aviation under the Air Corporation Act (1953).
The major subsequent change of policy was introduced in January 1981. The
Government, under pressure to promote economic development at the regional level
through tourism and other industrial development, decided to start a third level, feeder
airline, Vayudoot.
The Deregulation Movement
However, by the middle of the 1980’s, the performance of the national airlines and of
the Government’s policies were coming under criticism from a number of directions.
International tourism was growing relatively slowly and two inhibiting factors were
the performances of Air India and Indian Airlines. The former was constrained by its
small ageing fleet and by the need to serve Government demands and the excellent
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reputation is had earned over the years was being eroded through a lack of reliability
and generally poor service. This, together with protectionist policies, were acting as
constraints on the growth of international tourism. The problems at Indian Airlines
were similar and the airline had a reputation for lateness, for cancelled flights and
poor customer service and the Government was under pressure to inject capital into
the airline. Vayudoot had not solved the problems of providing access to tourist
destinations to the extent that had been hoped.
The first tentative steps towards a more liberal policy were taken by the Government
of India in 1986 when the Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation announced that
private sector airlines would be granted licences to operate as “air taxis”. The
expressed aim was to boost capacity on the main tourist routes. To be considered
eligible, the operators were to use “expatriate funds” to acquire their aircraft and these
had to have at least 15 seats and no more than 50 seats. Also, the air taxis were not
permitted to plan any departures within 2 hours of an Indian Airlines or a Vayudoot
flight. Fifteen licences were issued within a short time (Mhatre 1994).
Despite this, criticism continued to grow. Indian Airlines was carrying 9.9 million
domestic passengers in 1987/88, but independent assessments estimated that the
market could grow to 25 million by 1995 if capacity restrictions were overcome and if
services improved in a more competitive market (Louden 1993). At the same time,
against the background of a poorly performing economy, the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank were urging India to allow the private sector greater scope
to compete in areas previously reserved for state enterprises. The Government
responded in 1989 by announcing an “open skies” policy under which it would begin
a process that ultimately would allow the air taxi operators to offer scheduled services
in competition with the national carriers. At the same time there was a clear signal
that “unofficial” scheduled operations would be permitted in the meantime. In
addition, the Government stated its intention to privatise Air India and Indian Airlines
by first placing them under the Companies Act with subsequent sale in part or in
whole.
To qualify for a licence as an air taxi operator, the Director General of Civil Aviation
required the private sector airlines to operate an equal number of flights on routes of
less than and greater than 700 kilometres and fares were to be regulated. In 1990,
however, the restrictions on the taxi operators were relaxed with the exception of the
control on purchasing aircraft with expatriate funds and again the stated intention was
to boost capacity on tourist routes. Eleven applications were submitted to the Director
General of Civil Aviation and, in 1990, five airlines were given approval to
commence. Interestingly, one of the air taxi’s, India International Airways, was
granted approval to fly to Kathmandu from Delhi and Varanasi from April 1991. Air
Asiatic, based in Madras, imported a Boeing 737 to fly between Madras and Bombay,
but it discontinued operations after only five months, during which time it made 363
flights and carried 23,437 passengers. The other new entrants mostly operated smaller
turbo-prop aircraft.
These new entrants fared poorly, but the commencement of East West Airlines in
February 1992 heralded in a different era. Backed by one of India’s largest travel
groups, this Bombay-based operator soon made a major impact on the market with its
seven B737-200’s and three F27’s. Its entry was assisted by a strike at Indian Airlines
and it carried more than one million passengers in 1992-93. One of the significant
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policy developments was that the air taxi’s were permitted to obtain up to 40% of
their equity finance from foreigners. Jet Airways, also backed up by a travel group,
took up this option in 1993 with 20% funding from Kuwait Airways and 20% from
Gulf Air. In the same period, the other significant airlines to introduce jet aircraft
were Damania Airways and ModiLuft.
These operators all expanded rapidly, but in addition to taking traffic away from
Indian Airlines and Vayudoot, they all recruited pilots and engineers from the
national carriers. Plagued by industrial disputes and shortages of key operational staff,
Indian Airlines increasingly was being weakened. Vayudoot was losing large amounts
of money and was folded into Indian Airlines. The Minister of Civil Aviation
responded by placing restrictions on the recruitment of pilots and engineers into the
new carriers. Also, the Minister banned publication of timetables and the requirement
that the private sector airlines fly an equal number of routes above and below 700
kilometres was enforced. Officially, the justification for halting the progress of the air
taxis was air traffic congestion at Bombay and Delhi airports.
The situation improved in 1994 when the Government repealed the Air Corporation
Act  (1953) and issued new guidelines for granting scheduled airline status for private
sector airlines. Each case was to be examined on its merits, but the operators were
required to have a minimum fleet of 3 aircraft and to show evidence of an appropriate
maintenance organisation and training facilities. Also, the government has stipulated
that the new carriers were to provide services on a minimum number of lower yield
routes. The new carriers had to prove their financial fitness and the carriers had to
bear some of the responsibility for the social and other low density routes.
The regulations divided the network into three categories. Category I included the
main trunk routes, Category II covered the “social” routes, and Category III included
all remaining routes. Each scheduled carrier flying Category I routes was required to
deploy an additional minimum of 10% of that capacity (in terms of available seat
kilometres) on Category II routes and 10% of the capacity on these routes has to be
operated within those regions that had some of the least economic fares. In addition,
the carriers had to provide a further 50% of their capacity on Category III routes.
With the enactment of the Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal)
Act (1994), Air India and Indian Airlines became limited liability companies
incorporated under the Companies Act (1953). In the words of the Director General of
Civil Aviation, the industry has been “demonopolised”.
The Experiment With Competition
There has been no shortage of new entrants, but it must be said that the airline
industry in India is particularly risky from a financial point of view. As is the case in
other countries, the airline industry is very competitive and there is little margin for a
loss in yield and load factor. However, there are additional factors that are making it
difficult for all of the airlines to remain financially viable, including Indian Airlines.
First, a 117% surcharge was placed on the price of fuel during the Gulf War,
increasing the price from 60-70 cents US to around $1.60 per litre (Prasad 1996).
Although the airlines have been granted a dispensation to import their own supplies,
customs duty and handling charges bring the costs up to a similar level. Added to this,
airport charges are high and the airlines are required to collect a 15% tax levied on the
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passenger fare, the Inland Air Travel Tax. Several airlines have had difficulty in
paying the tax revenue to the customs authorities and at least two, ModiLuft and East
West, have had their operations suspended as a result.
Also, all of the airlines have been operating with leased aircraft given the uncertain
progress of the reform process, and the falling value of the Indian Rupee has left them
exposed to currency cost increases. The private sector airlines initially recruited pilots
and engineers from Indian Airlines at as much as five times their previous salaries
(Ballantyne 1996). This practice has been banned by the Government and now all of
the airlines are faced with the challenge of training more technical staff. The private
sector airlines so far have not banded together to pool resources on maintenance,
training or even for ground handling and security. One of ModiLuft’s senior
executives claimed that the break-even load factor was 67% and a fall of 5% in the
load factor would result in a fall in profits of between 45 and 84%, depending upon
the starting point (Dasgupta 1995).
Indian Airlines has led the way in increasing the general level of fares by 40%
between 1993 and 1995 (Ballantyne 1996). However, the Government has refused to
accede to the latest request for a 10-12% increase in domestic fares based on higher
costs of purchasing fuel. Given the costs of operation in the Indian context, it is
notable that it has been claimed that fares are half the level of comparable air services
in Europe (Dasgupta 1995). Indian Airlines claims it is required to keep its fares 17%
below its average on some of the secondary routes while its private sector rivals are
not so constrained. Discounting so far has been limited, but in 1994 Indian Airlines
introduced discounts of up to 10% for point-to-point fares and some airlines have
offered a free return trip on selected flights.
The Government’s policy initiatives have undoubtedly increased the amount of
aircraft capacity on offer and one analyst has been led to comment that there has been
Öuncontrolled expansion, transforming a monopoly market into a chaotic free-for-all
almost overnight. There are now seven scheduled private airlines, 18 non-scheduled
operators and 27 others waiting in the wings proposing to enter the fray (Ballantyne
1996). It is has been estimated that all airline combined now offer 50,000 seats each
day while demand exists for 36,300. Despite this claim, the Government has stood
firm on its opposition to the proposed entry by an airline owned by Tata Industries
with 40% equity from Singapore Airlines on the grounds that the market could not
withstand the scale of operation envisaged. There can be no argument that consumers
are the ones gaining the benefit from a wider choice of airlines offering greater
reliability and frequency, increased capacity, and improved in-flight service and
passenger reservation and handling.
Infrastructure constraints have been a feature of deregulated markets and this is no
less true in India. The new entrants have lacked terminal facilities, each has invested
in its own security systems and ground handling. Apron congestion at Bombay, New
Delhi, Calcutta and Madras has posed a major problem. The Government now
requires the airlines to park their aircraft overnight at the nearest designated airport
rather than at their operational base and this is claimed to be a constraint on the
adoption of hub-and-spoke network strategies (Vakil 1996). In 1996 the Government
has taken steps to address these problems by adopting a “Tourist Action Plan”
according to which it  will upgrade existing airport facilities and build new airports
(Mayes 1996).
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Successful new entrants in developed markets must possess some strategic advantage,
and most opt to pursue lower costs so that can sustain low fares. The new Indian
carriers did, at first, lease older versions of the Boeing 737, but many have been
introducing the B737-300, -400 and now the -500 series. When these ownership costs
are coupled with relatively poor utilisation resulting from operating constraints, the
new entrants have not derived any significant advantage from this quarter. Training
costs were minimised at the start by poaching crews and engineers, but now the new
carriers have to bear the full burden of staff development. Salaries paid by the new
carriers were considerably higher, totally opposite to the case for new entrants in the
United States and other places.
With regulated fares it is predictable that the new airlines would attempt to
distinguish themselves from the incumbent, Indian Airlines, through superior service.
Their higher pay and better conditions for staff and their modern aircraft have helped
them develop a reputation for punctuality and reliability and they have set new
standards for in-flight service. However, these are not sustainable advantages and
Indian Airlines has improved its performance. Moreover, Indian Airlines has a much
larger fleet and a more extensive network, and its introduction of a frequent flyer plan
in 1993 will continue to be a marketing strength. The new airlines have been forced to
commence with relatively small fleets and then have been expected to spread their
capacity across different classes of routes. These constraints have meant that the
option pursued by many other start-up airlines of building up frequency on a route
before opening competition on other fronts has not been available. As a consequence,
many of the airlines continue to operate with very low frequency and a large network.
Probably the single most important requirement that most new entrants face is access
to capital, particularly to sustain early losses while establishing a place in the market.
ModiLuft, Sahara India, and NEPC are all backed by large industrial groups Jet
Airways is owned by a sizeable travel group, as was East West. Jet Airways is 20%
owned by Gulf Air and Kuwait Airlines, but cooperation between these carriers does
not extend beyond some schedule coordination, although Jet now has signed a
memorandum of understanding to establish feeder airlines. NEPC took over Damania,
renamed it NEPC Skyline and intends using NEPC as the feeder airline. Also, NEPC
has taken over the management of UP Air, a regional carrier in Uttar Pradesh.
ModiLuft’s relationship with Lufthansa has been severed and it is looking for fresh
alliances.
Indian Airlines has improved its services but has come under continuing criticism for
its financial losses. There are several extenuating circumstances that must be taken
into account. First, when one of its A320 aircraft crashed in 1990, the rest of the
airline’s A320 fleet was grounded for ten months pending the outcome of an
investigation. Shortages of pilots and engineers have been so severe that aircraft have
had to remain idle while the private sector airlines have been seeking increased
capacity. Indian Airlines continues to bear the main burden of providing services on
the social routes while it has had to cope with industrial disputes as its numerous
entrenched unions seek to improve their position. Salary increases have been
approved and the airline has a strategy to deal with its shortages of pilots.
A major plank in this strategy is the commencement in March of 1996 of its own low-
cost operation, Allied Services. The aim is to keep overheads to the minimum and to
use the older B737 aircraft from the Indian Airlines fleet. The new airline has allowed
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Indian Airlines to recruit some of its former pilots who had gone over to the new
carriers without having to deal with seniority issues within Indian Airlines. Those
B737’s not required by Allied will be sold off so that Indian Airlines can operate a
more uniform fleet and it can provide career advancement opportunities for its pilots
by re-training them to fly its A300 and A320 aircraft.
At the same time, the talk of merging and privatising Air India and Indian Airlines
has continued.  The current position of the Government is that both airlines will be
kept separate, although there have been some attempts to rationalise operations and to
carry out joint marketing initiatives. In particular, Indian Airlines has introduced 17
new international services, a move which has released the capacity pressures on Air
India so it can concentrate on winning back market share on the long haul routes
while improving the average yield for Indian Airlines. Code sharing has been
introduced and the national carriers are integrating their reservations systems.
Despite all of the activity, overall traffic has grown slowly. Indian Airlines carried 3
million fewer domestic passengers in 1995-96 than it did in 1987-88. The private
sector airlines, including scheduled and air taxi operators, carried 3.98 million
passengers in 1994-95 (later figures are not available), a 37% market share. The total
traffic, therefore, grew by only 10% in 8 years. Over the period 1980 to 1986
(calendar years), there had been an increase of 89% in passengers carried. In other
situations where the airline market has been liberalised, the market has expanded
quickly. It needs to be asked why the market could grow as much as it did when
Indian Airlines had no private sector rivals in the period up to 1986 and then so
slowly when economic conditions were supportive and when the airline industry as a
whole was upgrading its product.
Liberalising airline competition in India - lessons from Australia
Hooper
17
Table 2: Indian Airlines Traffic Task 1987-88 to 1995-96
Year Passengers Task Performed Capacity Used Load
Passenger Kilometres Available Seat
Kilometres
Factor
('000) ('000) %
1987-88 9,934,958 8,251,515 10,412,679 79.2%
1988-89 9,541,788 8,243,895 10,103,330 81.6%
1989-90 9,390,656 8,271,810 10,650,345 77.7%
1990-91 7,471,120 6,860,737 8,588,895 79.9%
1991-92 8,311,844 7,498,354 10,107,965 74.2%
1992-93 7,268,443 6,623,188 8,889,576 74.5%
1993-94 7,229,810 6,475,119 9,447,538 68.5%
1994-95 6,897,700 6,150,039 8,590,065 71.6%
1995-96 6,927,021 6,272,294 8,278,561 75.8%
Source: Director-General  of Civil Aviation, India,  various annual reports.
What Can Be Learned From the Experiences Elsewhere?
Economics of Airline Competition and Regulation
There are significant differences between one country and another in so far as
commercial aviation is concerned. At one extreme there is the well-developed
lucrative market in the United States and at the other extreme there are domestic
markets only beginning now to realise their potential. Governments in developed
economies tend to place an emphasis on providing benefits to consumers whereas, in
developing countries suffering from inadequate surface transport links, a key
objective for aviation is to assist in national development and to promote social
interaction. Notwithstanding these differences there are some lessons that have been
learned about airline competition and regulation.
Perhaps the most fundamental of these concerns the nature of economies of scale.
Many countries regulated their industries believing that, if the market were left to its
own devices, a monopoly would emerge. The evidence is that small airlines can
survive in competition with large ones; that there are no significant economies of firm
size beyond a fleet of 4 to 5 aircraft. This does not mean that there are no economies
of scale in airline operations. Indeed, larger aircraft tend to produce seat kilometres at
a lower cost than smaller aircraft. The trade-off is that, for a given size of market,
frequency must suffer if the size of the aircraft is increased. After price, and putting
the issue of safety to one side, the most valued aspect of airline service is frequency.
In the Indian context, the new entrants have been restricted to operating relatively
small jet aircraft while having their fares regulated. This being the case, it should be
expected that these airlines would want to build up their frequency on the densest
routes. However, a third plank of the Government’s policy comes into play by
constraining the way the airlines, including Indian Airlines, can deploy their fleets.
There are two ways this imposes higher overall costs on users. The first is that the
airlines have to choose between having mixed fleets of aircraft, using smaller
turboprop aircraft for the lower density routes and their jets for the trunk routes.
Though larger aircraft yield economies of operation, this is only of value if the seats
can be sold. If aircraft in a mixed fleet are matched more closely to demand
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conditions, some savings can be generated. However, even large airlines avoid having
mixed fleets knowing that this increases the costs of training and maintaining flight
crews, engineers and spares. It also can affect reliability as it reduces the airline’s
flexibility in scheduling. Given the small scale of the new entrants, this is a significant
burden and it is not surprising to see the emerging trend for the trunk operators to
associate with feeder airlines and for Indian Airlines to form its own feeder airline.
The second way costs are increased is that the new airlines are commencing with a
larger network and with lower frequencies than would be likely under completely free
conditions. This means that the airlines are not able to exploit what is known as
“economies of traffic density”. There are some fixed costs associated with the
opening of a new route including maintenance and administrative arrangements,
passenger and traffic handling, marketing and the inevitable losses that occur as a
presence is established in the market. As the traffic becomes more dense, these fixed
costs are spread more thinly and so it is in the interests of airlines to develop their
networks in such a way as to maximise traffic density. Evidence from North America
indicates that, for scheduled jet airline services, these economies of density continue
to be achieved up to 40 million route ton kilometres (Gillen et al 1990).
The constraints on aircraft choice and allocation to routes deny the airlines the
opportunity to exploit these economies of density and constraints on airport
infrastructure, as has been noted above, prevent the airlines from developing hub-and-
spoke network strategies. These are known to yield significant savings to airlines and
to give them a greater ability to cover a larger network of connecting points than is
possible under other network strategies. All of these factors are resulting in lower
aircraft and labour productivity than is achievable in other airline markets.
The Managing Director for Sales and Marketing for Indian Airlines was quoted
recently as saying that only 20 of the 70 domestic routes served by Indian Airlines
were profitable and that the core of the business was built on the “golden quadrangle”
linking Bombay, New Delhi, Madras and Calcutta (Mayes 1996). Furthermore, the
cost to Indian Airlines of just operating according to the same guidelines as the
private sector airlines would have saved it 1.58 billion Rupees (approximately $48
million US)  in 1985. This provides some indication of the burden all of the operators
are bearing to cross-subsidise the uneconomic routes.
When the United States deregulated its market, it recognised the problem of serving
small communities and it committed itself to pay subsidies according to strict rules of
eligibility. The commuter airlines were well suited to the task since the problem arose
on short haul routes and the view was taken that when traffic reached 40 passengers a
day in each direction, the community could support its own services. The problems of
larger airlines vacating unprofitable routes did not raise major problems with this
safety net in operation. Undoubtedly there is scope for promoting smaller airlines to
deal with the low density routes in India but there are some significant routes that are
not of a short haul nature (eg Andaman Islands). India has to find solutions to these
problems, but a concern all economists have with cross-subsidies is that the
association between the costs of providing a service and the benefits to the
community becomes obscured and often this results in inefficiency. The comments
made above about the fundamentals of airline economics suggest the need for an
evaluation of the current policy and of alternative strategies to achieve the
Government’s objectives.
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The Australian Experience
When the Government of India made its first steps in 1986 to liberalise competition in
its domestic airline industry, the number of passengers carried in a year was 9.2
million. In the same year in the United States, a market of a different scale and nature,
the airlines carried 390 million passengers. Australia’s market size was 11 million
passengers in the twelve months prior to deregulation in December 1990. Since this
traffic was being shared between two airlines in an approximately equal way, it can
be seen that Australia entered into deregulation with two airlines each smaller than
Indian Airlines.
The network for Indian Airlines includes close to 60 airports whereas the Australian
operators confined their services mainly to 18 airports. While the average density of a
route is much lower in India, averages can be misleading. Over half of the Australian
passengers boarded or alighted at either Sydney or Melbourne and 82% of the traffic
is shared between the nine major ports of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide,
Perth, Canberra, Coolangatta, Cairns and Townsville. India has its “golden
quadrangle”, Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta and Madras. Both India and Australia have a
small number of routes that could sustain competition and they have other routes
where the traffic density is low. The two Australian domestic carriers achieved close
to 40 million revenue tonne kilometres per airport served while Indian Airlines
averaged closer to 10 million revenue tonne kilometres, well below the level
necessary to exhaust economies of traffic density.
In summary, the Australian market is of a size that is relevant to the Indian market,
but the two major carriers in Australia have not had to spread themselves as thinly as
has Indian Airlines and, now, the new private sector airlines. Even so, Australia has
only a small number of routes that would be considered dense by North American
standards. It is notable, though, that the effect of a new entrant into the industry in
Australia was to precipitate a price war that resulted in an increase of 4 million
passengers in a single year even though the nation was in the middle of a recession.
The total number of domestic passengers increased from 11 million in the twelve
months prior to deregulation in December 1990 to almost 25 million five years later
and Australia seems to have succeeded in expanding the domestic market under
deregulation more so than India.
The new entrant in Australia, Compass Airlines, operated 5 Airbus A300-600R
aircraft in a single-class configuration and it flew only the dense routes. This aircraft,
on paper, gave the new carrier a cost advantage and, with its low overheads, Compass
was relying on being able to sustain low fares. However, the two established carriers
responded immediately with low fares of their own and the ensuing price war gained
maximum publicity and resulted in many Australians flying for the first time in their
lives. Though Compass did not survive for long, its impact has been long-lasting. The
airlines have succeeded in penetrating new markets and they are using their discounts
to continue developing price-sensitive segments of the market.  Unrestricted fares
have tended to rise in the post-deregulation era, but the widespread availability of
discount fares has forced the average price down. The result is that Australians enjoy
some of the lowest domestic air fares anywhere in the world (Bureau of Industry
Economics 1994).
The key lessons that have been learned from deregulation in Australia are that:
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Q the regulated airlines had considerable scope to cut costs
Q the boom in travel to tourist resorts in the midst of a recession indicated that the
regulated airlines had failed to develop significant markets for low cost travel
Q the market could be very competitive even with a small number of rivals
Q actual competition is more effective than potential competition (three is better
than two) and failure of one airline during a recession does not prove there is
only room for two
Q the deregulated market is risky and volatile and airlines need “deep pockets” to
survive
What also became clear in Australia was that the Government’s policy quickly
became overtaken by events in a dynamic market. A firm position was adopted during
the review of aviation policy in 1985 that the national airlines would not be merged
and nor would they be privatised. Even when the decision to privatise was taken, the
Government initially believed it could retain 51% of the ownership, but the financial
sector would not accept this and the Government found it had to fully divest itself of
ownership of the airlines. Also, the Government came to recognise that it made no
sense to sell two assets separately, that they would be stronger when combined.
Having made these decisions it was just a short step to allow other Australian carriers
to operate on international routes. Continuing financial pressures on the owners of
Ansett Airlines and the failure of the new entrants left the Government few choices
when the only serious bidder for a half share of Ansett was Air New Zealand. The end
result is that the Government has had to do an about-face on issues of merger,
privatisation and a common airline market with New Zealand all in the space of five
years.
Concluding Comments
India and Australia both commenced the uncertain process of reforming their
commercial aviation sectors from around the middle of the 1980’s, and both started
from a position where they had two national carriers, one operating international
routes and the other operating domestic routes. The markets were of a comparable
size, although Indian Airlines had to spread its resources more thinly over a wider
network. India has had many new entrants whereas Australia has had only two, and
both of these failed after a short while. Australia’s market has grown substantially
while India’s has achieved only a modest increase. Australians now enjoy access to a
wide range of discount fares while discounting in the Indian market has been
relatively subdued. All in all, India has been more cautious in its approach to
liberalisation and has shown its concern to protect Indian Airlines rather than to
address the wider economic benefits of a more competitive industry.
There is a sense that the airline industry in India is at the cross-roads. The first
effective new entrants have gone out of business or have been absorbed, and there are
signs of financial stress among the remaining carriers. Indian Airlines lacks the pilots
to operate its full fleet and it continues to make losses. Its expanded international
operations will provide it with higher yield traffic, and devolving its regional
operations to its off-shoot, Allied Express, will help to improve the situation. The
Government of India, as did Australia’s, prefers to keep its airlines separate and is not
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eager to sell off national assets. However, competition is a powerful force and the
strong airlines around the world mostly have integrated domestic and international
operations. The need to have a subsidy mechanism to encourage airline services in a
country where surface transport links are inadequate is understandable, but there
comes a point where the costs of supporting these services is out of proportion with
the benefits. The challenge is to find a better way to proceed.
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